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 In the 1990s, Arab states responses to the changing global environment fell into 
one of the following categories:1) An authoritarian backlash, such as the one in Algeria 
and Sudan that led to and exacerbated civil wars and  to the consolidation of military 
dictatorships in Iraq, Libya, and Syria; 2) The consolidation of monarchies, with little if 
any political openings, as in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and 
Bahrain; and 3) The opening of political systems to accommodate rising political forces 
largely by pacting agreements that guarantee the hegemonic political forces a privileged 
position in the power structure circumscribing the democratization process leading to the 
emergence of restricted electoral democracies.
1 Cases in point are Morocco, Tunisia, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Yemen, and Lebanon. This paper in its first part focuses on this 
third type of response and analyzes the main characteristics of restricted democracies in 
each of the mentioned countries and examines the role that political parties and the 
administration of justice play in improving the conditions of the underprivileged groups 
classes. In the second part, the paper draws on the examples of authoritarian and the 
conservative monarchies of the Arab Gulf for comparative analytical purposes 
particularly in evaluating the role of the judiciary (since political parties are banned and 
virtually nonexistent) in defense of the underprivileged classes and groups. 
 
                             I.  Restricted Democracies 
The term-restricted democracy denotes a political regime with a form of election 
that is not fully free yet allows political opposition limited access to power. It is an 
                                                 
1 Restricted electoral democracies became also prevalent in Latin America and some were coined as 
democradura. See  Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Shmitter and Laurence Whitehead, Transition From 
Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).   3
intermediate point between an authoritarian regime and what Robert Dahl termed as 
electoral democracy, “polyarchy.” Dahl defines polyarchy as incomplete democratized 
political regimes.
2 Restricted democracies can be differentiated according to their degrees 
of political freedoms, particularly freedom of association, the levels of political parties 
institutionalization, the independence of the judiciary, and responsiveness to the different 
social classes and groups interests.  
Restricted democracies limit the abilities of political parties to organize freely and 
expand their power bases, and undermine their ability to present viable alternative 
agendas. One of the prime obstacles to the development of political parties as instruments 
of articulation of the different political, cultural, and class interests is the law of 
associations that governs the licensing process for political parties and the lack of an 
independent judiciary to adjudicate violations to the law. As a result, the destiny of 
political parties is left to the whims of the dominant political elites who change the rules 
of the political game depending on their reading of the threats that any given force poses 
on their hegemonic status. Arab states that are included under the genre of restricted 
democracies were selected on the basis of two criteria: a) They succeeded in holding one 
or more national elections characterized as fair by national and international observers 
during the last ten years; b) they allowed opposition political parties to compete. The 
states that meet these criteria are Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon, and Jordan; 
Kuwait, too, qualifies, although it does not allow women to vote.  In the following 
sections each of these countries is discussed. 
 
                                                 
2 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Political Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Conn. Yale University 
Press, 1971), p. 8.   4
 
Tunisia’s Swings Between Restriction and Authoritarianism  
In Tunisia, the successor of Habib Bourquieba, Ben Ali, reneged on his pledge to 
open the political system, which led the country on an authoritarian path very similar to 
the one followed by Alberto Fujimori in Peru where electoral democracy was used to 
legitimize the ruler satisfying the dominant global discourse on democratization while 
strengthening the repressive apparatus of the state. The irony is that Ben Ali’s pledge was 
a consequence of him signing in 1988 a “National Pact” with opposition political parties, 
non-governmental organizations, and unions in which they condemned the previous 
single-party regime of Habib Bourquieba for marginalizing institutions and personalizing 
and monopolizing political power.  
An authoritarian ruler, Ben Ali nevertheless maintained some of the welfare-state 
policies instituted by his predecessor, such as giving priority to education and health; 
taking measures to alleviate unemployment, poverty, and regional inequalities; and 
instituting policies to promote women’s rights. In 1998, Tunisia started adopting the 
policies of structural adjustment in accordance to the “Washington Consensus” signaling 
the end of universal healthcare and education but was not keen to introduce the IMF’s 
request to abolish food subsidies and to freeze minimum wages.
3 Free healthcare, 
education, and social welfare continue to be provided to low-income groups.  
                                                 
3 The economist John Williamson coined the term “Washington Consensus” in 1989. He called it that 
because of the support it obtained from the IMF, the World Bank and the U.S. government.  He said it 
stood for ten policies: measures to promote trade and foreign direct investment, fiscal discipline (smaller 
budget deficits), fewer subsidies, tax reform, liberalized financial systems, competitive exchange rates, 
privatization, deregulation and measures to secure property rights. Although that there was a slight shift on 
one of the key premises of the Consensus that is “the rising tide of global free trade will lift all boats”  but 
the core components of the program are still in operation.   5
The Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique party (RCD) that is headed by 
Ben Ali is the direct descendant of the Neo-Destour Party of Bourqueiba, which took 
power when Tunisian became independent in 1956. The party is the only national party in 
the country, with 2 million members and 7,800 branches. Under Ben Ali, its ideological 
orientation has become an eclectic mixture of left-leaning  and neo-liberal principles. 
There are six officially recognized opposition political parties, but they are weak 
and have limited popular support. Efforts to form a united opposition front have thus far 
failed, which contributed to the consolidation of the hegemonic status of the ruling party. 
The largest opposition group is the center-left Mouvement des Democrates Socialiste 
(MDS), which is split between supporters and opponents of Ben Ali. Leftist opposition 
groups include Harakat Ettajdid (HE, Renewal Movement, ex-communist party); the 
Rassemblement socialiste  progressive (RSP); Parti Social Liberal (PSL); and the two 
pan-Arab political parties, Parti l’Unite Populaire (PUP) and the Union Democratique 
Unioniste (UDU). The most important Islamist group is Al-Nahda Party whose members 
ran as independents in 1989 and won 13 percent of the national vote in the parliamentary 
elections. The party is banned under the new Association Law that prohibits political 
parties based on religion, race, language, or region. Many of its leaders (including 
Rached Gahnouchi, its founder) are in prison or exile.  
Labor and student unions and the legal opposition parties suffered important 
setbacks and blows due to the increasing state repression, but they also forced the state to 
reconsider some of its neo-liberal economic policies and its human rights violations. Al-
Nahda Party and the Tunisian Communist Workers’ Party along with organized labor and 
the student movement confronted the regime and were able to reduce some of the social   6
costs of privatization, but they were not strong enough to force Ben Ali to open the 
political process, legalize all political parties, and change the majority list system and the 
Laws of Association. 
The judicial system remained largely controlled by the executive, limiting its 
impartiality. Hence political leaders were imprisoned and political parties and human 
rights organizations were banned, which limited the access of the underprivileged groups 
to justice. The legal system comprises civil and criminal courts, including the courts of 
appeal and the Supreme Court, as well as military tribunals within the Ministry of 
Defense. The constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary, but it is part of 
the Ministry of Justice; the government appoints, assigns, grants tenure to, and transfers 
judges, making them subject to government manipulation. In February and April 2001, 
high school students and unemployed youths protested price hikes and changes in 
examination procedures, and the demonstrations ended in violence when the authorities 
failed to adjudicate the dispute. Such incidents are symptomatic of widening social 
conflicts left unresolved that increase the possibility of increasing state violence; the 
conditions of the lower classes are expected to deteriorate given the current global 
economic recession. The socio-economic costs of global economic decline will most 
likely be transferred to the most vulnerable groups, namely the poor, women, and 
children, in part because of the relative weakness of political parties, particularly those 
that could articulate the interests of these groups.  
The Tunisian judicial system has its limitations, but it does provide individuals 
speedy recovery of their debts. This is achieved by a procedure called injunction de payer 
before a general jurisdiction judge. When the existence of a debt is established, the judge   7
grants the injunction to pay and the debtor cannot oppose the order. On average, the 
entire procedure from filing to payment takes less than a month. The legal costs are low 
(approximately $54) when represented by a lawyer and free if the plaintiff handles the 
case.
4 By way of comparison, in a country such as Venezuela, which has a similar level 
of economic development, the parties to the case must go through 31 independent 
procedural steps between the filing of the lawsuit and payment; legal fees are 
considerably higher, averaging $2,000 for lawyers and $2,500 for court fees.
5  Tunisia’s 
simplified and cost-effective procedures were mainly the products of the welfare state 
established by Bourqueiba. 
The percentage of people living below the poverty line (19.9 percent) has been 
steady since the early 1990s given that the economy has been growing at 4.4 percent over 
the same period.
6 Consequently affecting disproportionately the most vulnerable sectors 
in the so-called “shadow zones” in the rural areas where about 39 percent of the country 
population lives: Child mortality rate in the shadow areas is double that in the urban 
areas, and maternal mortality rates constitute about 52 percent of the total maternal 
deaths.  
At another level, discrimination against women in terms of employment and 
wages has decreased over the years, but the rate of female illiteracy in all categories is at 
least double that of men. Among 10- to 14-year-old children, 5.5 percent of urban girls 
are illiterate compared with 2.2 percent of urban boys, 27 percent of rural girls, and less 
than 7 percent of urban boys.
7   
                                                 
4 World Bank Report 2001, p. 123. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Entering the 21
st century, World Bank Report 1999/2000, p. 183. 
7 AFROL Gender Profile: Tunisia. http://www.afrol.com/categories/women/profiles/tunisia    8
With the economic slowdown and increasing unemployment, one can predict that 
future public policies may become less responsive to the need of the urban lower classes, 
working class, rural areas, and women, most particularly when the government continues 
to crackdown on the organizations that are set up to represent these groups limiting their 
ability to mobilize public support. In 2000, a notable increase in public protests 
accompanied the regime’s “criminalizing” of unlicensed political activities,
8 which 
further undermines the abilities of underprivileged groups to peacefully protest their 
grievances. Finally, the political fallouts of the U.S. “War on Terrorism” is most likely to 
reinforce the government crackdown on Islamist political parties as well as secular 
political groups and all other leftist opposition figures. Such conditions could usher in a 
more violent path for conflict resolution in light of the absence of an effective and 
independent judiciary that can mitigate and adjudicate social disputes.  
Morocco and Its Restricted System 
In Morocco, the monarch responded to domestic and international pressures by 
initiating a timid attempt to open the political system. Economic liberalization and a 
measured electoral democracy were introduced. However, the king, who claims to draw 
his power from the Divine, remains the maker and breaker in the political system. The 
authority of the king renders notions of separation of power as inapplicable; he appoints 
and dismisses prime ministers and cabinets. Among the innovations of the 1992 
Constitution is that it gives the prime minister the right to propose to the king nominees 
for cabinet portfolios. However, the king retains the final word. The Constitutions 
proclaims that the administration of justice is independent of the executive powers and it 
provides for a body, the Superior Council of Magistracy, to ensure that procedures 
                                                 
8 See Human Right Watch World Report 2001: Tunisia: Human Rights Developments.   9
regarding the promotion and discipline of judges are kept free. In fact, such freedom is 
circumscribed by the logic of Muslim law; the king, as commander of the faithful, grants 
the judges their mandate and in principle he can decide at any time to withdraw this 
mandate. In such a system, the king delegates justice.
9  
In this context, one might expect that political parties have little if any space at all 
to form, let alone influence the allocation of state resources, generate public policy, and 
expose corruption.  In the peculiar context of Morocco, political parties and the state have 
developed an uneasy coexistence over most of the post-independence period. The state 
did not altogether ban political parties; rather, it banned Islamist parties while all the 
other groups were allowed to organize as long as they did not challenge the authority of 
the king and the ruling elite. 
The opposition is dominated by the social democratic Union Socialiste des Forces 
Populares (USFP) and the moderate Islamist Parti Istiqlal (PI). Each is affiliated with a 
trade union—the USFP with the Confederation Democratique du Travail (CDT) and 
Istiqlal with the Union Generale de Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM). USFD received 
13.7 percent of the popular vote, winning 57 parliament seats in the last election held in 
1997, and the PI received 13.19 percent, capturing 32 seats out of 325. Have the political 
parties made the regime more accountable to the underprivileged groups, namely, the 
urban poor, women, and children? 
At the macro-economic level, political parties did not help in reducing the levels 
of poverty in Morocco, where more than 4 million live on less than $1 a day and an 
                                                 
9 See Omar Bendourou, “Power and Opposition in Morocco,” Journal of Democracy 7 no.3 (1996), pp 
108-122.   10
income disparity Gini index of 39.5.
10 This was in part because political parties that have 
participated in government have been right wing and closely allied with the king. Their 
political goals and ideologies do not include redressing the increasing gap between rich 
and poor and addressing urban-rural and gender divides. Only in 1998 did the leftist 
political parties with a social agenda in tune with social divisions participate in 
government. Thus, it is premature to evaluate their role and outcome in terms of poverty 
reduction, but tentative comments can be made. The coalition government led by 
Abderahmanne Yousefi, the leader of the USFC leftist party, of forty ministers from 
seven center-left political parties, can claim credit for some improvements in human 
rights and political freedoms, but it has been less successful in lowering unemployment 
and raising the living standards following a decade of slow economic growth.
11  It was 
only after the labor unions mobilized in 2000 that the Government in order to avert a 
major strike agreed to increase the minimum wage by 10 percent  and redraft the 
proposed labor code. Similarly, the ascendance of the political left to the Government had 
its imprints on the nature of some of the decisions taken, such as the response to workers 
unions and the hiring of an additional 17,000 public servants to alleviate urban 
unemployment. However, the challenge facing leftist political parties is formidable given 
the number of people living in poverty, which has risen by two-thirds in the 1990s. In 
1999, the poverty rate increased to 19 percent.  Poverty is greatest in the central and 
north-central regions, affecting 36 percent of rural dwellers and 24 percent of city-
                                                 
10 Income disparities in restricted democracies are the highest in Tunisia (41.7), followed by Jordan (36.4); 
Yemen (33.4); Egypt (28.9), Kuwait (na) Lebanon ( na)  Human Development Report 2001. pp 182-4.   
11 Economic Intelligence Report : Morocco 2001, p.5.   11
dwellers in Meknes-Tafilalet.
12 The rural areas have been affected the most as a result of 
a systematic and longstanding neglect since colonial times.  
Morocco is at a crossroads. If economic growth, which has been averaging only 
1.9 percent between 1991 and 1998, persists at that level, unemployment could reach 27 
percent in 2005.
13  This economic situation coupled with acute social antagonisms make 
the role of the political parties vital to avoid violence. If the king remain committed to the 
rules of the political game, I believe that leftist and Islamist political parties will become 
critical players to negotiate conflicts and avoid the high economic and social costs of 
violence, particularly in light of the pending issue of the Western Sahara conflict.  
The State needs to re-examine its expenditure priorities: At present, 5.1 percent of 
its GDP is allocated to defense as compared to 1.2 % of GDP on public health.
14 Morocco 
will certainly be affected by the increasing global recession and the political and 
economic imperatives of the new “War on Terrorism” and its possible ramifications on 
its Islamist political parties. This makes the role of the political parties and its true 
representation and participation in the Government even more critical. One can argue that 
Morocco, unlike Tunisia, may stand a better chance to avert violent conflicts in the future 
because it has created a space for political parties.  
Morocco has taken measures to combat corruption under pressures from political 
parties, labor unions, NGOs (such as Maroc 2020 and Transparency Marco), business 
groups (Confederacion Generale des Entreprises de Maroc), and international donors. 
The Yusefi government took concrete steps to make the judiciary more accountable and 
transparent. For example, in October 1999 some 60 magistrates were accused of 
                                                 
12 Ibid, p.13. 
13 Ibid. 
14 HDR 2001, p.197.   12
corruption, 13 of whom were suspended for periods ranging from one to six months and 9 
of whom were disbarred. It is interesting to note, however, that the judges in question put 
up a strong resistance and succeeded in avoiding further actions against them.
15 Other 
measures were taken to strengthen the General Inspection Office of the Ministry of 
Justice in order to control corruption and establish an oversight mechanism. New laws 
were also introduced to eliminate the ambiguities and contradictions of the previous laws 
that offered opportunities for corruption.
16  This anticorruption campaign was also 
undertaken to modernize the institutional-legal framework and to enable Morocco to 
better meet the demands of a global economy. As a result,  investors’ risks and the costs 
of economic transactions will be minimized. However, in the absence of sound social 
policies, it remains to be seen whether the poor will reap any immediate benefits from the 
Government’s  anti-corruption drive. 
Egypt and the Perils of its Restricted Democracy    
Egypt represents another variant of restricted democracy. Income disparity is not 
as acute as Morocco and Tunisia, due to the radical reforms introduced by Gamal Abdel 
Nasser after his coup in 1952, yet it remains an important source of social conflict.   
Nasser’s agrarian revolution brought Egypt closer to the Korean and the East Asian 
model where resolving the agrarian question by reforming land tenure ameliorated class 
conflicts. Because of Egypt’s central position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, resources were 
invested in war to the detriment of its economic and social growth. Its socialist past and 
the legacies of its war with Israel resulted in an authoritarian political system. 
                                                 
15 Guilain Denoeux, The Politics of Morocco’s “Fight against Corruption,” Journal Middle East Policy 
vol. , no.2  (February 2000). 
16 Ibid.   13
This system, however, underwent significant changes in the last three decades in 
terms of the social class-base of the regime, land tenure, the role of the middle and 
working classes in the political process and the pace of Egypt’s reincorporating into the 
world capitalist system after an absence of two decades.
17 These changes propelled a 
process of expanding the social base of the regime through allowing traditional political 
parties such as al-Wafd and the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, Tagammu’, Nassererites, 
and Egyptian Communist parties, to participate in electoral politics. 
In Egypt, the development of political parties as meaningful instruments of 
interests articulation and channels for political participation was hindered by a number of 
factors. The electoral laws are based on the party-list proportional representation (PR) 
system with a high threshold (8 percent), which make it difficult for opposition parties to 
win parliamentary seats. This PR system was changed in 1990 after the Supreme 
Constitutional Court ruled that the 1986 election PR law discriminated against 
independents.
18 Then, the winner-takes-all system was introduced, which made it even 
more difficult for opposition parties to win parliament seats. Alongside electoral laws, 
gerrymandering, redistricting, access to media and campaign resources, coercion, and 
voter intimidation were instruments used by the ruling National Democratic Party to 
maintain its political hegemony.   
As a result of the 2001 election, the banned Islamist opposition party Muslim 
Brotherhood is represented by 17 deputies in parliament, after its candidates ran as 
independents. Although they became the largest opposition bloc in parliament, 
                                                 
17 See John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of the Two Regimes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). 
18 Marsha Prispstein-Poususney, “Behind the Ballot-Box: Electoral Engineering in the Arab World”  
Middle East Report  (Winter 1998).     14
reinvigorating debates in the 454-seat legislature, their ability to shape policy is limited.  
Their political goals and discourse remain limited to cultural issues pertaining to their 
political interpretation of Islamic thought and to urging the government to respect human 
rights and end the state of emergency. The goals of the Muslim Brotherhood fall short of 
articulating a program that addresses the plight of the lower classes and the 
underprivileged group. This limits their role even if they manage to increase their 
parliamentary seats.  
Despite the limitations of efforts to open the political process, voters did gain an 
opportunity to punish the ruling party candidates by voting for independent candidates. 
Such voters were motivated by social grievances and the lack of government response. 
They were given an instrument to influence electoral outcome, but they were not yet 
powerful enough to influence policy because of the lack of accountability between 
elected and electors. The result was that the NDP’s official candidates won only 175 
seats, with 65 percent of deputies in the outgoing legislature losing their seats. However, 
the NDP was able to co-copt them and to maintain its 2/3 majority in parliament and its 
hegemony over public policy, allocation of resources, and safeguarding the perpetual 
presidency of Husni Mubarak. The liberal Wafd Party, the second most important party, 
won only 7 seats. The winner-take-all- electoral system clearly discriminates against 
smaller political parties, leaving them outside the political process and by extension 
excluding the underprivileged groups. With such political configurations, Egypt’s 
restricted electoral democracy largely remains a one-party system with authoritarian 
tendencies.   15
The judiciary in Egypt is relatively independent of the executive when compared 
with Morocco and Tunisia. The Constitutional Court was able to push for a more 
transparent electoral system on two occasions: one in light of the 1987 election and again 
in 2001 when it imposed full judicial supervision on a polling post after it was controlled 
by the ruling party and its clients with the support of the state’s security apparatuses. As a 
result, voters are still intimidated, but to a lesser degree.   
The increasing autonomy of the judicial system marks a departure from the 
authoritarian model under which no separation of power existed. Ironically, however, this 
departure was coupled with the infusion of new laws that reduced the legal instruments at 
the disposal of the underprivileged classes.  This change is consistent with the 
“Washington consensus” and its neo-liberal accent. In a way, the Egyptian model 
rekindles the old debate between social rights and political rights. Critics claim that laws 
and their administration are social construct and thus are not social class-neutral. Hence, 
the access to justice and the adjudication process depend on the ideology and class 
interests upon which jurisprudence is constructed and the class interests it is suppose to 
serve the most.
19 
In this context, it is important to discuss the implications of Law 96/92, one of the 
cornerstones of Egypt’s economic liberalization program. This law, which took effect in 
1997, put an end to Nasser’s agrarian revolution, which favored the small and poor 
peasant. The law has gradually reorganized the relationship between landowners and 
tenants and generated serious land conflicts that remain unresolved. The purpose behind 
                                                 
19 For example in 1966 Jamal al Utayfi, a prominent legal scholar, argued that the land laws of 1948 that 
regulated the relationship between  landowners and tenants was the product of the capitalist era that gave 
the landowners too strong a position that needed to be changed. In effect new laws were enacted in the 
1960s which again were reversed in 1992. See Nathan Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World 
(Cambridge, Uk: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 85.    16
Law 96 is to accelerate the integration of the Egyptian countryside into the global 
capitalist market by providing large landowners the right to use their land and to plant 
export-oriented crops as they see fit. This opened economic opportunities for large 
agribusiness while undermining the peasant economy, and it resulted in an increase in 
violent land conflicts. In 1997, several thousand peasants gathered for a protest march in 
two provinces of Minya, and in the confrontation that ensued the houses of local 
landowners were burned and a bus was set in fire. Three protesters were killed and 
another 20 were injured. Other peasants protested in the Nile Delta and set fire to the 
agricultural ministry in an attempt to destroy official records establishing landownership. 
During the first six months of 1999, land disputes claimed the life of 18 persons; 97 were 
injured and 135 were detained. These land related conflicts were concentrated in 35 
villages 20 of which are in Upper Egypt.
20 
 These are just a few examples of serious land conflicts resulting from the 
Egyptian government’s liberalization policies. Giving landowners the right to raise land 
rents and applying market-oriented policies has left poor land tenants with few options 
other than protest and violence.  
Political parties and organizations were very slow to understand and react to the 
gravity of Law 96. In 1997 leftist organizations such as Farmers Union of the Tagammu 
Party, the Nasserites, and the Islamist-oriented Labor Party joined forces to call the 
government to delay the implementation of the law for another five years. While political 
parties in Cairo were trying to mobilize peasants for nonviolent actions, peasants rioted 
elsewhere. Ultimately, the channels of representations (political parties and farmers 
organizations) could not reconcile the radically opposed class interests of the landowners 
                                                 
20 Land Center for Human Rights 1999-2000.   17
and peasants. Peasants put up a strong resistance. In the words of one peasant from 
Kamshih who resisted a police raid to evict them: “If they indeed come to take our land, 
what do I have to lose, then? So I do not care if I end in prison.”
21 According to another 
peasant, this one from Ezbet Abu Nisar: “the landlords tried to take away from us land 
we have been farming for seventy years and we fought back.”
22 
During the Nasser era the State enacted laws that protected peasants against 
increases in rents and market prices and prohibited landowners from ejecting tenants. 
Subsequent laws increased the rent significantly, which in 1997 became 22 times the tax 
value of the land (that is, less than a third of the market value). The rents were expected 
to increase from LE 850 per feddan per year to LE 2,500 a year.
23 No peasant can afford 
such increases; and around 710,000 households are (about a quarter of rural Egypt) are 
affected directly, together with around 230,000 sharecroppers.
24 
According to the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 1997 
survey, agricultural landholdings were key determinants of the economic health of rural 
families and noted the incidence of poverty among landholders was markedly lower (23 
percent) than among those without landholdings (35 percent).  The survey found that the 
levels of consumption were directly related to the size of landholdings. This decline in 
rural consumption continued between 1997 and 1999 coinciding with the application of 
Law 96.  
                                                 
21 Karim El-Gawhary, “Nothing More to Lose: Landowners, Tenants, and Economic Liberalization in 
Egypt,” Middle East Report  (July-September, 1997).; see also Steve Negus, “Peasants Face Mass 
Evictions” http://www.cairotimes.com/content/issues/ecref/peafac5.html   
22  Negus,  
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid.   18
The full and more recent effects of the Law 96 are not yet assessed, but from the 
initial data and information available some observations can be made. According to one 
study of a randomly selected number of households in the governate of Beni Sueif, the 
rapid doubling and tripling of land rents has led to the loss of all or part of the land by 
over 40 percent of households that have been cultivating these lands.
25 The loss of land 
increased the pool of floating labor, thereby depressing rural wages and increasing 
unemployment and underemployment. One of the most damaging effects of Law 96 has 
been the increase in child labor and the increased incidence of poverty among children in 
rural areas. Consequently, about one million children between the ages of seven and 
twelve are hired by agricultural cooperatives to work in cotton pest management under 
subhuman condition. 
Opposition political parties have thus far little, if any, effect  on the government 
application of Law 96; and peasant resistance although suppressed for now is expected to 
ignite again. Recurring incidents of violence and homicides have increased in the last 
three years, indicating that the issue is far from resolved. Reports have been made of 
landlords using armed thugs to forcefully evict and even kill tenants. These incidents 
acquire additional importance if seen within the context of an inefficient legal system 
where an eviction case could take more than 1,000 days to clear.
26 The irony is that Law 
96 was meant to serve the landowners, yet the pace of adjudication of the law did not 
satisfy some of them, which led them to enforce it by illegal means. Such conditions 
propel actors (individuals or collectivities) to settle their disputes by violent means 
                                                 
25 Human Rights Watch 2001. 
26 See World Development Report 1997. World Development Report 2002. p. 122.  See also Institute for 
the Study and Development of Legal Systems,  Country Project: Egypt 2000. This is addition to the costs 
of litigation since in Egypt as well as Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen simple debt collection case requires 
to be heard by professional judges in general jurisdiction courts   19
because other means are less efficient.
27 Arbitration and mediation channels of land 
disputes have collapsed particularly after introducing Law 26/1994, which eliminated the 
elections of village chiefs. They are now appointed by the government. Village chiefs are 
pivotal in the mediation of land disputes in rural areas.  Finally, the lengthy process of 
litigation and the suffocating backlog has rendered the process inefficient. 
An average civil litigation requires thirty to forty appearances before the first 
instance court, and only 15 percent to 20 percent of the cases are prepared with sufficient 
evidence and legal documents for a judge decision. The preparation phase can take as 
much as two years, whereas the adjudication does not exceed two months. The low legal 
fees in Egypt makes it relatively easy for lower income groups to access the system 
provided they can afford to take the time (30 to 40 court appearances) and more than two 
years to adjudicate the case.
28 
In light of the above, it is not far-fetched to conclude that given the dire economic 
conditions in rural as well as in urban centers, rising levels of unemployment can  
generate serious violence if the regime does not try to open the political process for 
political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, in an attempt to negotiate social 
conflict by democratic means. The levels of violence, then, could change if there is an 
alteration in the restricted nature of the political process and actors’ respective 
responses.
29 The “War on Terrorism” in Egypt  can make matters even worse because it 
can exacerbate the regime’s crackdown on Islamist groups, including those that do not 
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advocate political violence, as well as on secular progressive political parties such 
Tagammu’, Communists, and Nasserites, and then tightening the screws on political 
participation. 
Restricted Democracies in Sectarian Societies 
Despite the different level of socio-economic development of Lebanon and 
Yemen, both exhibit some similarities in their social cleavages that are worth analyzing. 
The two countries represent a variant of restricted democracies where tribal and sectarian 
cleavages come into play with socioeconomic and political variables influencing the 
distribution of political power, processes of political inclusion/exclusion, and the patterns 
of socio-economic development. Most political parties in such polities largely reflect in 
their sociology the most pronounced cleavage (tribal or sectarian allegiance) and in their 
behavior the main social grievance. This latter is mainly observed in the opposition 
parties.
30 The most explosive combination to the detriment of political stability and 
democratization is when the main cleavage and the main grievance coincide (for 
example, when the incidence of poverty is disproportionately higher in one group, and 
this same group is also underrepresented in the political structure). Yemen and Lebanon 
do not only contend with the troubled relationship of political parties with the state, the 
biases of the administration of justice, and the place of underprivileged groups figure in 
such configuration, but also the sectarian and tribal divides. Sectarian divides particularly 
if manifested violently tend to increase income disparities (as was the case in Lebanon 
and Yemen), increase crime rates, and increase the costs of economic transactions and 
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human development, hence affecting economic growth and the country’s economic 
performance. 
Political parties in vertically differentiated societies are instrumental in 
ameliorating social conflicts when the political system is inclusive enough to allow 
political participation without restrictions and providing political rules acceptable by 
most groups. Such success has been evident in Belgium and Switzerland historical 
experiences that avoided the downfalls exhibited mostly in third world countries.
31  In 
sharp contrast, the political systems of Yemen, Sudan, (until 1990) and Lebanon’s 
institutional arrangement (e.g. electoral laws, access and distribution of political power, 
economic and cultural resources) under which political parties contest power is not 
acceptable by key political groups. One or more major group perceives that the rules of 
the political game are discriminatory and hence detrimental to that group’s vital political, 
economic, cultural, or sectarian interests. 
32 Consequently, political parties could become 
tools for mobilization polarizing the polity and leading to violent civil wars, as occurred 
in  Lebanon, Yemen and Sudan.  
A.Yemen: Tribal Politics and a Rentier Political Economy
33 
In 1990, the Socialist Party of South Yemen and the General  People’s Congress 
[of the North’s] signed an agreement to unify the country. Within a few months, about 40 
political parties appeared on the scene, along with dozens of new newspapers and 
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magazines. Establishing a democratic arrangement was the only way to unify two states 
with differing social and political forces and a history of antagonisms.  
In the democratization process, stability and continuity are supported by the 
following: (a) the elites must be committed to solving their differences by political means 
and accept the rules of the political game, and (b) the agreed upon rules must be flexible 
enough to accommodate the grievances of all parties. These two requirements were 
violated in Yemen. The Socialist Party (YSP) and its supporters in the south (including 
tribes) perceived that the pact was not implemented and that the General Peoples 
Congress tried to control the access to political power and state resources. In 1994, this 
perception led to violent confrontation between the northern troops and supporters of the 
YSP in the south. The north prevailed. Since then, confrontations stemming from the 
YSP-GPC conflict have constrained the democratization process, polarizing the polity 
and inhibiting the development of social capital. This has affected governmental 
allocations of resources:  about  8.1 percent of the GNP goes to the military, as opposed 
to 2.1  percent on health, and 7 percent on education.
34 The country lags behind in  areas 
of health and education; illiteracy rates are especially high among the female population, 
and infant and maternal mortality rates are high as well.
35  In the context of the other 
restricted democracies discussed in this paper, Yemen’s military expenditures are second 
only to Jordan. Although one cannot attribute the high military expenditures only to the 
tribal divide but certainly it is a major contributing factor. The high military expenditure 
illustrates one of the costs of tribal divisions in a restricted system and its negative impact 
on the country’s socioeconomic development. 
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   The GPC is not a political party in the Western sense in terms of organizational 
structure, internal democracy, membership requirements and ideology. It is an amalgam 
of mainly northern tribal chiefs and associates who joined forces to defend their political 
interests from the YSP. Such an umbrella group helped in widening the support base for 
President Abdallah Saleh and his ruling elite. In contrast, the YSP is a conventional party 
with a hierarchy typical of most Communist parties, organized in cells. Its ideology is 
close to the European- social democratic model after the YSP modified its Marxist-
Leninist orientation. The YSP was not immune from tribal politics and allegiances, which 
were manifested during internal crises and in its troubled relationship with GPC. Since 
the YSP power base is mainly in the south, the north-south divide and the tribal politics 
that this involves, along with power politics and political-ideological differences largely 
affect its relationship with GPC. Under such a political environment, political parties 
have not been able to articulate political and social objectives that are consistent with the 
long-term interests of the public, most particularly the most vulnerable groups among 
them.        
       The Islah Party is the other most important political force in the country. Its 
leader, Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar, is the maximum leader of  the Hashid tribal 
confederation and the most important tribal figure in Yemen. (The  president’s tribe 
forms part of the Hashid confederation.) The Islah Party forms an integral part of the 
system; it is a legitimizing force and at the same time plays the role of an “opposition” 
party within limited contours. The Islah Party and its ambiguous Islamist discourse 
attracted different strands of political Islam to its ranks, which made it a heterogeneous 
group. The Islah Party has had a limited role in serving the interests of the underserved   24
and the most vulnerable groups. Like most Islamist parties, the main focus of the Islah 
has been on cultural issues; their interpretations of Islam center on the status of women 
and their reproductive roles.  It has no plan to address social and health problems such as 
maternal mortality rates, which is now  among the highest in the world. It is also silent on 
high female illiteracy and school dropout rates, nor has it addressed the host of 
contributing causes such as limited family resources, gender socialization, lack of 
transportations, lack of incentives because of low returns of education, and 
unemployment.  This is not surprising because the political power of Islah and the ruling 
party stem more from tribal politics than from being elected with political platforms 
under which they could be hold accountable. The Islah Party and GPC are accountable to 
tribal chiefs and business elite and are not accountable to the underprivileged members of 
these same tribes. In this mode, accountability reflects a power relationship in which, 
citizens and elected officials relationship is mediated by tribal and class structures. 
Finally, the YSP, whose political platform addresses the fundamental concerns of the 
poor and women, is left outside the political system, and its political role is very limited. 
Moreover, the state suffers from two interrelated problems affecting governance 
and accountability. The state is unable to extract taxes from its citizens, which deprives 
the state from vital resources for the functioning of its bureaucracy and services.
36   It has 
been argued that if a state extracts its rents from exploiting natural resources and other 
public enterprises, this tends to reduce its citizens’ claims on it. Yemen provides some 
support for this thesis. The state’s inability to collect taxes may explain why developing 
countries that depend on natural resources (rentier states) have lagged behind in forging a 
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relationship between the ruled and the state conducive to governance and accountability. 
In most of these rentier states, the relationship between the ruling elites and the 
subordinate classes is one of patronage and clientelism underscored by rampant 
corruption. This is true of Yemen as well as all Arab Gulf states. 
In Yemen, property taxes are mainly levied in cities, where it is appended to the 
electricity bill. In rural areas no property tax is collected, because of the resistance of the 
tribes. The inability of the state to have a coherent and enforceable property tax policy is 
a key indicator of the weakness of the state. Then the problem of governance and 
accountability becomes compounded with the nature of the state and its formation.
37  By 
way of comparison, the government tax revenue constitutes 13.7 percent only of  
Yemen’s  GDP, while in the U.S. is 20.4 percent of  its GDP, and in the United Kingdom 
is 36.5  percent of its GDP.
38    
The judicial system has been controlled by the executive since 1990, when the 
constitution was written. According to the constitution the president presides over the 
Supreme Judicial Council, which is the organ that names, promotes, and dismisses judges 
and approves the judiciary budget before it is submitted to the Ministry of Finance for 
inclusion in the overall government budget. As a result, the judiciary is not independent; 
it is tied to tribal politics and clientelism, and there is ample opportunity for corruption. 
Judges’ salaries are very low and  are barely sufficient to meet housing, qat, and food 
expenditures. Almost any lawyer can make more money than a judge or a prosecutor.
39 In 
fact, in October 2001, 20 judges were dismissed and 108  were forced to retire in an anti-
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corruption sweep.  However, these selective measures will not prevent future corruption 
because independent institutional mechanisms are lacking. The current Judicial 
Inspection Authority is a tool of the Supreme Judicial Council. 
The judicial system is popularly perceived as inefficient in adjudicating disputes, 
especially when compared with other existing conflict resolution mechanisms such as 
tribal arbitration and mediation. About 70 percent of disputes are adjudicated through 
tribal arbitration. This parallel justice system is only reinforced by the inefficiency of the 
state and by the power of tradition. The court fees are low, but court employees 
commonly must be bribed to hide files and move them higher in the judge’s calendar or 
make them disappear.
40 This explains why individuals opt to settle their disputes through 
the tribal system or by violence. 
Most of the disputes in Yemen concern land titles and land ownership. Land 
conflicts are common in Morocco, Egypt and Yemen. About 80 percent of the cases in 
Yemen that make it to court are related to land disputes. Some of these disputes are 
attributed to the cumbersome process of land registration. It is not uncommon for owners 
to sell the same piece of land to several buyers or for people to sell property that they do 
not actually own.
41 
Yemen’s restricted democracy is a complex system where the interplay of tribal 
political parties, regional divides, a weak state, and inefficient judiciary make it difficult 
for the most vulnerable sectors of the population to lobby for a reorientation of public 
resources. The only political force that might be able to articulate these interests along 
with its political grievance given the dominant position of the north political 
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establishment is the YSP. The YSP currently is a minor political player and is excluded 
from the ruling elite. Until this is corrected, political instability can be existed to 
continue, as will infant and maternal mortality, illiteracy, and low human development. 
The U.S. “War on Terrorism” and its attempt to enlist Arab support may also lead the 
ruling elite in Yemen to further restrict the political participation of Islamist and secular 
opposition groups, to the detriment of democratic political development.  
B. Lebanon:  “Sectocracy” and Warfare 
Lebanon has had a restricted democratic system since 1943. This makes it unlike 
other cases of restricted democracies discussed in this paper, which mostly came about 
since the 1980s. (Kuwait started its flirtation with this process in the early 1970s with 
interruptions.) Lebanon’s sects represent the functional equivalent of tribes and its 
political system acknowledges only the sect as a unit of political representation.  This 
type of political representation was explicitly recognized in the country’s 1943 and 1990 
constitutions. Sects (like the tribes in Yemen) are vertical social divides where political 
power and public office depend on membership in the group rather than on political 
parties or on meritocracy. 
Sectopolitics have covert and overt costs. When jobs are filled according to 
sectarian considerations, regardless of merit, covert costs include  brain-drain, 
mediocrity, nepotism, clientelism, corruption, and inefficiency in government 
bureaucracies. Corrupt or inept individuals feel less accountable to the public they are 
suppose to serve than to their sect bosses who were behind their appointment, who most 
likely will defend them in the event that disciplinary measures are taken against them. In 
sectarian political systems, accountability and governance become seriously   28
compromised by the logic and dynamics of the system. The control of corruption 
becomes tied in with sectopolitics as was manifested during the anti-corruption drive 
launched by the government of Salim Hoss in 1999. This campaign failed chiefly because 
most sect leaders and their corrupt followers resisted shouldering their responsibility in 
controlling corruption and bringing about a more transparent system in handling state’s 
resources.  
  The more obvious cost is sectopolitical polarization, which often leads to civil 
wars. The costs of the Lebanon’s civil war exceeded $25 billion; most of its economic 
infrastructure was destroyed, more than 65,000 people were killed,  84,000 were 
wounded, tens of thousands were handicapped, and 800,000 citizens (in a country circa of 
four million) were forcibly displaced. The costs of war have a bearing on income 
distribution and as is in most cases it increases the levels of poverty and widens the 
income distribution gap. In Lebanon, for example, the poor made up about 50 percent of 
the total population in 1959-1960 and  decreasing to 22 percent in 1973-74, a year before 
the civil war (1975-1990). In 1994, the first systematic study carried out by UNDP found 
that the percentage of poor households increased again to 28 percent of which 7.5  
percent lived in a state of abject poverty.  This represented a 6 percent increase from their 
1974 levels.
42 The income distribution pattern in the mid-1990s resembled that of the 
1960s; by 1995 52 percent of the population could be classified as low income.
43   
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In the 1990s Lebanon reinforced the sectarian system of political representation 
by stipulating the sects of the leaders of the three branches of government; the president 
had to be a Maronite, the speaker of parliament had to be Shiite, and the prime minister 
had to be a Sunni. A political troika is institutionalized in a process that often interrupted 
the functioning of governing since it required compromises that was something new to 
the ruling elite. The pre-1990 constitution provided ample power to the president, which 
made governing an easier affair than it was under the 1990 Taif Constitution, which 
provided more power to the speaker of parliament and the prime minister while reducing 
that of the president. 
One of the main consequences of Lebanon’s sectarian political representation was 
that it became more difficult for political parties to form and develop as cross-sectarian 
organizations in order to compete in national elections. The winner-take-all electoral 
system compounded by the sectarian distribution of parliamentary seats and sectopolitical 
polarization proved to be formidable enemies to secular political parties.
44 Despite the 
increase in members, most secular parties have been unable to win parliament seats. The 
only political parties that managed to become part of the political game were those that 
adhered by the sectarian system of political representation and ideologically projected 
themselves as defenders of their sect’s political interests. Examples include the Shiite 
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Amal Movement and Party of God; the Kataib and ( the banned Lebanese Forces) as 
Maronite groups; the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) representing a sector of the Druze; 
and a host of political forces and groups claiming to represent the Sunni. The Communist 
parties and other secular groups remain underrepresented in the political system. All of 
these political parties have hierarchical organizational structures and are organized by 
cells. Internal democratic practices for electing party officials are nominal, dissenting 
views are suppressed, and dissenters are mostly expelled from party ranks.    
Opposition  political parties, especially those of the left and labor unions, were 
instrumental in bringing into public debate the declining living standards of the working 
class and lower classes and were able to mobilize demonstrations against consumer price 
hikes, tax increases, and privatization of public enterprises and in support of political 
freedoms. The effectiveness of such mobilizations measured in terms of policy outcomes 
remain limited, but nonetheless forced the government to slow down its privatization 
drive. In the latest show of force was the government attempt to implement the public-
sector restructuring program on the national airline, Middle East Airways (MEA). The 
company is 99 percent owned by the central bank since 1996 with staffed by 4,500 
workers including 160 pilots operating only nine aircrafts. MEA is running a loss of some 
$40 million a year. In order to prepare MEA for privatization the government pledged to 
cut-down the work force. The issue is contentious because most of the “surplus” labor 
was appointed by sect leaders and to satisfy the sectarian quota system applied in public 
employment. Since the surplus workers were Shiite the issue became entangled with 
sectopolitics. Political parties, such as the Shiite Party of God (Hizbollah) and labor 
unions, opposed the laying out of workers eventually a compromise was reached where   31
those laid out were compensated a handsome amount of money. The MEA case brought 
into play the complexities of labor-capital conflict in a system that privileges sects over 
other forms of political organization and the difficulty that this bring to bear on secular 
organizations such as political parties, labor unions, and non-governmental 
organizations.
45 This case also demonstrates the difficulty that a state faces in making its 
enterprises more efficient, productive and competitive in a global economy. I am not 
making the case for privatization, but my intention is to reveal the irrationality of 
sectopolitics and its irreconcilability with the imperatives of any rational economic 
planning.  
The bureaucratic and judicial systems are based on the model left by the former 
colonial power, France. The judicial system is headed by a five-person Court of Justice 
dealing with matters of state, working along with four courts of cassations, 11 courts of 
appeal, and 56 lower courts. The judiciary is nominally independent but in reality is 
subject to government manipulation and to the meddling of the security services. The 
latter have always been an important instrument of coercion (less so during the civil war) 
but since 1990 have regained its notorious role thanks to Syria’s support. Most courts 
deal with civil and criminal cases. The government appoints the prosecuting magistrates 
and normally applies pressure on the magistrates to influence verdicts and sentencing. 
Trials, particularly commercial ones, could last years. The lower classes have lesser 
access due to the costs of litigation and lawyers’ fees.  
Lebanon’s dire economic conditions and the increased levels of poverty 
precipitated by the civil war and exacerbated by the ill-conceived economic policies 
pursued in the 1990s have left the country in an economic abyss. This condition is only 
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complicated by a sectarian political system that constantly generates grievances that 
make it even more difficult to deal with the dislocation and social conflicts produced by 
economic development. These occur in a system that opposes the development of 
national cross-sectarian political parties that could help in negotiating and mitigating 
social conflicts, avoiding the economic costs of political instability, and charting a more 
balanced socio-economic policy that takes into account the interests of capital as well as 
labor. Lebanon’s political and social forces have been exhausted by war and were caught 
off guard when the government decided its privatization plan and only an elite closely 
allied with finance capital was capable of articulating a response consistent with the 
“Washington Consensus” and its offspring.   
Jordan: “Democratizing” by Default 
Like Kuwait and Morocco, the kingdom of Jordan opened its political systems in 
response to a changing socio-economic and political environment. The political economy 
of this process varies depending on the alignment of domestic and international variables. 
Jordan enjoyed  a period of prosperity  in the 1970s and  1980s, thanks to the regional oil 
boom; the remittances of its workers in the Arab Gulf helped the Jordanian economy 
remain afloat, and the government was able to subsidize prices. During that period, the 
government could afford the political costs of suppressing dissent because it used 
effective instruments of co-optation and was supported by a growing and “content” 
middle class. Political freedoms were suppressed and political parties were banned in the 
1970s, and parliament was suspended between 1974 and 1984. 
By the late 1980s, Jordan defaulted on its foreign debt service and accordingly the 
IMF stepped in to make Jordan comply with the Washington Consensus. In 1989, the   33
government increased fuel prices by 30 percent, which prompted riots in the southern city 
of Ma’an, one of Jordan’s main transport hubs.  This riot was significant because Ma’an 
is one of the main tribal-support bases of the ruling monarchy, and  any fracture in the 
regime’s support base (in a country where the Palestinian population is a majority) could 
lead to its downfall.  The political configuration of Jordan (tribal-Jordanian with a 
majority Palestinian population) in an atmosphere mobilized by the politics of 
privatization, coupled with the ongoing intifadah in Palestine, made it  imprudent to carry 
out the “Washington Consensus” recommendations without  also permitting a political 
opening in the system. King Hussein ended martial laws and ordered the full restoration 
of parliament and the legalization of political parties to ameliorate social conflicts. The 
first election was held in 1989. 
During the 1990s the restricted electoral democracy suffered reversals caused by 
the serious political threat posed by the opposition. The King changed electoral laws to 
deny his political opponents success. Prior to the parliamentary elections of 1997, the 
electoral laws were changed, which led the opposition to boycott the election. The 1997 
electoral law is biased against the non-urban voter where the majority of Jordanian of 
Palestinian origins resides and where the Islamist enjoys strong support.
46 This law favors 
the East Bank tribes. The Islamist boycott of the 1997 election gave tribal leaders and 
government supporters the opportunity to dominate parliament. Hussein died in 1999 and 
his son Abdullah succeeded him. The political scene is at best uncertain while the new 
monarch consolidates his power base. 
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Some Jordanian political parties have a long history and have become  
institutionalized in the sense that they have outlived their founders and have a complex 
organizational structure.
47  A common characteristic of most opposition political parties 
of restricted democracies is their long tradition. Arab political parties such as the Wafd 
and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; the Yemen Socialist Party; the socialist and 
communist parties in Morocco, Tunisia, and Lebanon; and some Islamist parties in 
Morocco and Jordan survived the periods of suppression and illegality.  Their continuity 
facilitated the introduction of restricted democracies, helping states and ruling elites to 
widen their support base. This factor can explain why King Abdullah in Jordan like his 
counterpart in Morocco views the continuity of his regime as dependent in part on his 
ability to bring the opposition into the political process, particularly at a time when 
Jordan is undergoing economic structural changes and social tensions. 
Political parties in Jordan (like those in Morocco, Lebanon, and Yemen and to a 
lesser extent in Egypt) face the formidable task of building cross-tribal or cross-sectarian 
organizations when political systems and social structures resist such efforts. In Jordan, 
tribal politics encouraged and sponsored by the government deprived Jordan’s 22 
political parties of any real influence, a condition that opened the political field to 
ethnopolitics during the last three decades. Obviously this weakened political parties in 
general. The only political party that was not suppressed was the Muslim Brotherhood 
and that was for tactical political reasons:  the party expressed allegiance to the regime, 
and its anti-secular and anti-leftist discourse suited the government. The Muslim 
Brotherhood has emerged as the major political force in the country; ironically, it now 
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challenges the King’s foreign policy toward Israel. It has access to substantial amounts of 
funds from charity organizations, which allows it to provide social services in poor 
neighborhoods, thereby expanding its popular networks.  
The Islamist political program is strong in cultural-theological discourse and  
regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, but without a clear socio-economic transformative 
agenda that focuses on the underprivileged groups. They are vocal against women’s 
participation in the labor force, political process, reproductive rights, and for keeping 
women subordinate position in family structure sanctioned by personal status laws all of 
which are not compatible with the imperatives of economic development and human 
rights.  
Although political parties have played a modest role in Jordan’s political life, they 
have managed to focus attention on the detrimental effects of the IMF’s recommended 
restructuring program and the potential loss of sovereignty in the wake of opening the 
economy.
48  They have also helped in slowing down this process by demonstrating 
against it in the late 1980s and again in 1996 in what were referred to as the “bread riots.” 
These demonstrations forced the state and the IMF to revise the pace of their structural 
adjustment program but not its direction.
49 Consequently, the government was compelled 
to set up funds for low-income groups, maintain spending on health and education, and 
delay price increases in public utilities. 
Jordan's constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary. It clearly states 
that judges are “subject to no authority but that of the law.” However, the King must 
approve the appointment and dismissal of judges, who in practice are supervised by the 
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Higher Judicial Council. The Jordanian system of civil law is rooted in the Code 
Napoleon, a French legal system implemented in Egypt in the early 19th century. Like 
most judicial systems in the Arab world except Egypt, the judiciary in Jordan is 
subservient to the executive and is only nominally independent. The access of 
subordinate classes to justice is limited due to the cumbersome process and the high costs 
of litigation. 
Kuwait and its electoral flirtation 
Kuwait is the most restricted democracy of the group discussed in this paper; it is 
the only one that excludes women from the political process.  Like Jordan and Morocco, 
Kuwait is a hereditary monarchy, and the cabinet is formed by emir (ruler) decree. It first 
National Assembly was elected in 1963 and its constitutional term is four years. The emir 
of Kuwait dissolved the Assembly on three occasions (1976, 1986, and 1999). The 16-
member cabinet of 2001 includes seven members of the ruling family. Voting rights 
remain limited; only literate Kuwaiti  males aged 30 and above are allowed to run for 
parliament, and only Kuwaiti men over 21 can vote. 
The National Assembly has been  pressing the ruling family for more 
transparency in financial matters, a greater role in designing oil policy, and more 
oversight of defense contracts. The increasing assertiveness of the National Assembly is 
due to its political make-up of groups that range from the Pan-Arabist to Pan-Islamist. In 
the 1999 election, 20 of the 50 seats in the assembly were won by candidates with pro-
democracy credentials; 6 of the 20 described themselves as independents, and the 
remaining   14 were divided between the National Democratic Forum (NDF), established 
in 1991 as a successor of  Arab Nationalist Movement, and the National Democratic   37
Movement, established after the 1996 election. The Islamist groups won around 20 
seats.
50  These groups are not formally recognized as political parties but operate as clubs 
and caucuses. Some groups, such as the Movement to Cleanse Islamist Ranks, the 
Movement to Forbid the Forbidden, and secular parties, have clandestine organizations 
with cells structures 
The overall impact of these groups on the political process and in making 
government more accountable is reflected in the National Assembly debates, but if we 
measure their impact in terms of policy outcomes the result is not promising. For 
example, the Islamist groups in the assembly blocked a bill that would have allowed 
women to participate in the political process and guaranteed some basic rights. These 
same groups are tied with the system of patronage extended by the ruling family to buy 
their allegiance. Sheikh Saad, a member of the ruling family, has provided financial 
support to the Islamist in parliament, which affects their agenda and voting behavior. 
This limits the possibility of other groups in parliament to push on the issue of 
governance, accountability, better distribution of income, corruption, and women’s 
human rights.  
The most notorious avenue of abuse and wasting state resource has been defense 
spending.   Before the  Iraqi invasion in 1991, Kuwait spent less than 5 percent  of the 
GDP on defense.  After the invasion the government defense and security budget 
increased between 27  percent to 33 percent  amounting 7.5 of the GNP in 1997.
51 Some 
members of parliament consider this a waste of money on equipment that Kuwait will 
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never use; they also call it a golden opportunity for corruption. But they have thus far 
been unable to enact laws to control the situation. 
The constitution stipulates the independence of the judiciary; judges are not 
subject to any authority. However, they are appointed by the emir. The highest court in 
the land is the Court of Cassation, which reviews decisions of the Court of  Appeals. The 
Emir, however, retains the constitutional power to pardon or commute all sentences.   
      II.  Authoritarian Regimes and Monarchies’ Suppressive Backlash 
It is in order here to briefly discuss the remaining Arab states and the manner in 
which their regimes responded to the global environment in the last decade and their 
political prospects. Most of these regimes have considerably weaker political opposition 
which allowed them to maintain their systems highly authoritarian (Syria, Iraq, Libya) 
and monarchies in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain. Both 
types of regimes were sustained by the influx of petrodollars (Iraq, Libya and to a lesser 
extent Syria) coupled with severe coercion. Political opposition is practically 
exterminated in all of them.  
The monarchies with small populations were able to maintain their solid grip 
thanks to their rentier-economies and the wealth that trickled down. This allowed the 
development of welfare states and effective network system (along tribes and clans lines) 
of distributing patronage. Such condition minimized social conflicts in most of them. 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, nonetheless, have to contend with their respective restless 
Shiite populations that happened to be the most underprivileged politically and 
economically. Both states responded with violence and were able to keep the opposition 
at bay.   39
In the post-Gulf war era, however, hit by decline in oil returns, significant 
increases in expenditures on military-buildup, alongside with mismanagement of and 
corruption diminished the distributive capacities of these regimes. Consequently, the 
cooptation capabilities of the Gulf monarchies decreased with their decreasing resources. 
States such as Saudi Arabia ended with huge budget deficits (public sector debt increased 
from 87.6 percent of the GDP in 1996 to 102.1 percent of the GDP in 2001), which raised 
the specters of political instability.
52  Consequently, signs of economic discontent 
appeared in Saudi Arabia spearheaded by Islamist groups that have a strong base of 
support among the disaffected regions such as Asir in the southwestern province. It is 
noticeable, in this respect, that most of the Saudi hijackers that carried out the September 
11 attack against New York and Washington DC were from that region.   
Now and because of the geostrategic importance of the Gulf region, -as the main 
theater of  the “War on Terrorism” and for the stability of global capital,- the  basic needs  
of its  people for economic and social development, social justice and democracy are 
likely to occupy a back seat in the global agenda. It is becoming clearer that this new war  
will make it harder to achieve broader political participation and will further delay the 
required reform in governance. In the absence of equitable distribution of resources, the 
underprivileged classes, regions, sects, and groups  will remain on the fringes of their 
national economies and the political process. 
Finally, two important cases that stand out in the Arab countries are Algeria and 
Sudan both with protracted civil wars. Both cases represent instances of a political 
meltdown exacerbated by the world economy conditions along with uncompromising 
competing political elites.  Algeria’s civil war and its timing on the eve of the collapse of 
                                                 
52 The Economist Intelligence Unit Forecast September 2001, Saudi Arabia.   40
the Soviet Union which ushered in a new global system underscored by the “Washington 
Consensus” indicated the inability of the ruling elite and its opponents to work out a new 
political game that correspond with these changes. Algeria started in the early 1980s 
reversing its model of state-led development and introducing liberal economic reforms. 
Such a change in direction was in part due to the declining oil revenues in the aftermath 
of the oil- price crash in 1985-86. Economic liberalization in times of crises coupled with 
dwindling resources generated riots and wide protest movements for the most part until 
the 1990 elections. The political elite attempted to co-opt the opposition by opening the 
political process by introducing the first multiparty election since the country 
independence in 1962. But such decision was not pacted with the forces of opposition in 
the similar mode that was applied by the restricted democracies that is carried out the 
transitions from singular-party rule to multiparty systems. This at least provides some 
clues of the nature of the transition, the level of antagonisms among the contending 
forces and the political elite preparedness to negotiate a new political game. Hence when 
the elections were  held in 1990 which was contested by several political parties  
including the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) leftist groups, and a then newly formed 
party  from the Berber-speaking region, the Rassemblement pou la Culture el la 
Democratie (RCD). The FIS dominated the polls.  The period that ensued was of political 
violence between FIS partisans and the government party (FLN).  In the 1991 
parliamentary election the  FIS won 188 seats of the 231 seats on the first ballot, the FIS 
was clearly heading for a big victory which made the army step in to prevent this from 
happening. Since then Algeria has slid into a civil war.   41
Sudan’s civil war has a longer trajectory than most of the cases discussed in this 
paper (Lebanon, Yemen and Algeria). In other words it is an intractable conflict, which 
started in 1955 with a mutiny of southern forces protesting the northern domination, a 
legacy of the colonial rule. In the post-colonial period the north-south cleavage widened 
and acquired new dynamics and became entangled with uneven processes of capitalist 
development, allocation of state resources, cultural-ideological differences, cold war 
realignments, and competition over natural resources. In  1972 an agreement was reached 
under which the north was given autonomy and allowed the incorporation of southern 
political elite into the political process survived almost twelve years.  In 1983, the 
government decided to split the south into three distinct provinces, which was viewed  by 
the southern elite as an attempt to circumvent its influence particularly in light of the 
development of southern oil resources and the construction of Jonglei Canal. Ever since a 
new phase of this protracted conflict started that was later enmeshed with the rise of an 
Islamist government made even more difficult for the southerner Christian and animist 
population to compromise with the northern elite. 
The Algerian case exemplified a system that collapsed under the stress of a grave 
economic crises coupled with the introduction of structural adjustments while the 
political elite and its opponents were not ready to pact an agreement easing the transition 
to restricted type of electoral democracy. Sudan conflict and because its protracted nature 
and its ethnic/regional base was only exacerbated by socio-economic and cultural 
differentiations propelled by global forces ranging from international capital to the   42
political economy of aid which allowed the development of vested interest in maintaining 
the conflict rather than seeking a political solution.
53  
   
                                      
                              III. Concluding Remarks 
It is observed that the restricted electoral democracies are not uniform and each 
case has some unique properties. Yet some generalizations are in order. The case of 
Tunisia’s political regime in a country with the highest economic growth (highest income 
disparity) and with a relatively large middle class has managed to be the most restricted 
among our sample yet score high in the human development index. Whereas the 
remaining regimes with serious economic crises punctuated by political instability or its 
potentiality managed to be less authoritarian. In this category we can mention the cases of 
Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan. In these cases political opposition succeeded in obtaining 
some political gains giving the regime insecurities. Egypt’s case also stands out in one 
respect; its judicial system due to its legal tradition and strong institution has proved to be 
the most independent in our sample. This factor has helped in mitigating political 
conflicts between the ruling party and the opposition but with little bearing on the poor. 
Yemen and Lebanon two cases that witnessed civil wars and their polities are 
organized largely along sectarian and tribal lines exhibited two different political 
patterns. In Yemen the ruling party managed to consolidate and expand its tribal base 
after delivering a strong military blow to the opposition in the south hence felt more 
secure and less compelled to raise the ceiling of its restricted democracy. In contrast, 
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Lebanon’s  in light of its more fractured society than Yemen or any other  society in the 
Arab region, the resumption of the political process has been based on the politics of 
compromises between main sect leaders, hence, a democratic arrangement has been a 
must to maintain a functioning political system and  to avoid sliding back to violence. 
Labor unions, political parties, women’s groups, student movements, and other 
non-governmental organizations, that is the critical mass needed to expand the contours 
of restricted electoral democracies exhibit moderate levels of organization and strength in 
the restricted democracies discussed. Nonetheless, this critical mass invariably was able 
to moderate, slow down, and in some instances halt the economic restructuring policies 
advocated and enforced by the IMF.
54  Ironically, restricted electoral democracies were 
introduced with the prime objective to expand the power base of the states by allowing 
some political participation in times of crises and structural adjustment failed to comply 
fully with the terms and conditions of global capital and its institutions because of the 
latent forces unwittingly unleashed. 
Nonetheless this might change with the new contingency: the war on terrorism. 
The political economy of the  “War on Terrorism” and its regional and international 
imperatives could provide the ruling elites in the Arab states (as well elsewhere: in fact, 
there are new attempts to enact “anti-terrorism” laws in Latin America as new tool of 
political repression in countries such as Guatemala, Colombia, El Salvador and  
Nicaragua) with a chance to eliminate their vocal opposition, and hence facilitate the 
execution of the economic liberalization program by transferring the costs of such change 
to the most vulnerable segments of their population and to the weakest sectors of their 
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national economies (e.g., subsistence peasant economies, small scale industries, and 
public enterprises). Consequently, the danger on political freedom stems from the 
possible “criminalization” of social protest against such encroachments. Such a trend 
picked up momentum in Italy during the anti-globalization protests and is likely to 
increase in light of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC. Hence, the 
limited political and human rights gains achieved in the 1990s could be compromised 
again as were the case during the cold war. To illustrate this point, the Secretary of State 
Colin Powell during his visit to Qatar after the September 11 attacks requested from its 
ruler to “tone down” the programs broadcasted from the Jazira network, one of the very 
few open/free platforms available in the Arab World.  Powell’s attempt to restrict 
freedom of speech may be the tip of the iceberg of the unfolding “war on terrorism” 
discourse. And if it succeeds in setting the international tone, then, not only the restricted 
democracies of the Arab World are under threat, but political freedoms and democracy 
(polyarchy) worldwide may be very well suffer the dire consequences of this new war. 
It is crucial in this concluding section to underscore that the limited political 
access to the political process, justice, and resource distribution is not gender neutral. 
This is reflected by the limited access to women to employment, political power, and 
leadership of political parties, property rights. All of these are compounded by 
institutional discriminatory laws and social structures that are observed in a number of 
these restricted democracies. The empirical evidence suggests that with increasing 
income distribution gap and increasing number of poor, women and children tend to have 
the lion share of the poor stricken sectors. Hence with the introduction of market 
economies giving the current laws, women will remain outside the formal economy, less   45
secure, lower wages, limited access to credit, and the most vulnerable in times of 
economic slow downs or recessions.  
A key indicator for a frightening trend that affects negatively governance and the 
human development index is access to education. In this context it is important to 
mention the study of  Esteve-Volart which links between  growth in per capita GDP and 
gender inequality in primary schooling in the base year, using data from 90 countries and 
controlling for such variables as overall secondary educational and regional dummy 
variables. The study shows that a 1 percent increase in the female to male primary 
enrollment ratio increases the growth rate by more than 0.012 percentage point.
55 We also 
have evidence that shows that the dividends of economic growth, or for that matter 
economic slow down, are differentiated along class, gender, cultural, and ethnic lines. 
This differentiation largely depends on the respective group or class position in the 
hierarchy of political power and consequently how this hierarchy distributes gains and 
losses. 
For example, in Latin America countries, which witnessed economic adjustment 
and a resurgence of electoral democracies, suggests that women conditions worsened 
during the structural transitions. Keeping in mind that laws in most Latin American 
countries were changed to accommodate women rights to access land ownership, credit, 
managerial position, and political power. This implies, that in the absence of similar laws 
in the Arab states could mean that the combination of structural adjustment, current 
discriminatory laws and weak political parties within the contours of restricted electoral 
                                                 
55  World Bank Policy Research Report, Engendering Development: Through Gender Equality in 
Rights Resources, and Voice (Washington, D.C.:  World Bank, 2001), p. 88.   46
democracies will only worsened already bad conditions of women, particularly in rural 
areas.  
This condition is likely to exacerbate in the wake of the September 11 attack 
according to a World Bank assessment. The Bank predicts that economies dependent on 
non-oil commodity exports (e.g. Egypt, Morocco) and tourism (such as Lebanon, 
Tunisia) in the developing world will be hit the most which in turn will affect the most 
vulnerable people in the Arab countries discussed and in the global economy at large:  
women, children and the poor. 
    